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Review of Japan's Ocean Policy: Toward the 5th Basic Plan on Ocean Policy

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Abstract

This presentation reviews the efforts made to date in the current Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, given that two years have passed since the Cabinet decision in April 2023, and examines the efforts required in the next Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which is expected to be formulated in 2028.

The presentation will also focus on the “Priority Strategy for Ocean Policy” decided by the Headquarters for Ocean Policy in April 2024, and will present the initiatives required to ensure the effective implementation of Japan's ocean policy in the future.

Key words: Ocean policy, Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, Priority Strategy for Ocean Policy

1. Introduction

In light of the fact that two years have passed since the current Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was approved by the Cabinet in April 2023, this presentation reviews the efforts made to date and examines the initiatives required in the next Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which is expected to be approved in 2028.

In addition, I will also focus on the “Priority Strategy for Ocean Policy,” decided by the Headquarters for Ocean Policy in April 2024, and present the initiatives required to ensure the effective implementation of Japan's future ocean policy.

2. Changes in Japan's Ocean Policy

2.1 Global Trends in Ocean Policy

Prior to the latter half of the 20th century, each country was free to utilize its own maritime resources based on the “principle of maritime freedom.” However, after World War II, the Truman Declaration (1945), presented by U.S. President Harry S. Truman, prompted countries to assert their rights over their own coastal waters. Subsequently, the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1958) was held and the four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea (Convention on the Territorial Sea, Convention on the High Seas, Convention on the Continental Shelf, and Convention on the Conservation of Living Resources on the High Seas) were adopted. International understanding of environmental conservation also grew, leading to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (1972) and the establishment of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP).

In light of these legislative and policy developments, the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (1973-1982) was held, and after nearly a decade of deliberations, the United Nations Convention on the Law

of the Sea (UNCLOS) was adopted in 1982. UNCLOS is characterized by a shift in the principle of the law of the sea from “freedom of the sea” to “management of the sea,” and its preamble clearly states that “the various problems of the sea are closely interrelated and must be considered as a whole. In response to the growing interest in the marine environment, UNCLOS also includes a section on “Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment,” which stipulates that “every State has the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environment” (Article 192). (Article 192). In addition, because nations should cooperate on the oceans for their protection, development use, and management, the article also includes a section on scientific research, marine technology development, and transfer, among others.

As a policy initiative based on these legislative developments, the UN World Commission on Environment and Development (commonly known as the “Brundtland Commission”) was established in 1984 based on a UN General Assembly resolution. The report submitted by the Commission in 1987 (Our Common Future) stated the need to promote development while preserving the environment and resource base, and formulate the concept of “sustainable development,” which refers to the relationship between environmental conservation and development as “meeting the needs of the present generation without compromising the needs of future generations.”

Based on this concept, the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit) was held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. At the Earth Summit, the “sustainable development” principle and “Agenda 21,” humanity's action plan for sustainable development, were adopted. Subsequently, the World Summit on Sustainable Development (Environment and

Development Summit/Johannesburg Summit) was held in 2002, the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) in 2012, and the 50th anniversary of the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Stockholm+50) in 2022. The pursuit of initiatives based on “sustainable development” principles continues.

2.2 Ocean Policy in Japan

In Japan, from the 1960s to the 1970s, in response to international trends, there were calls for the establishment of a comprehensive system for promoting ocean development or for the maintenance of domestic legislation. However, none of these efforts went beyond policy recommendations, and “individual management of the oceans,” so to speak, was maintained. In particular, the dual classification of the oceans as “wide high seas” and “narrow territorial seas” and the principle of freedom of the sea, which had been the premise of the world's maritime order until then, were favorable to Japan, which had an excellent fishing industry and a powerful maritime industry. Therefore, during the deliberation process of UNCLOS, Japan strongly insisted on its maintenance, and even after the adoption of UNCLOS or its entry into force, it took measures that emphasized the maintenance of the principle of “freedom of the sea” as much as possible and did not actively respond to the new maritime order based on UNCLOS. However, with the adoption of Agenda 21 in 1992 and the entry into force of UNCLOS in 1994, countries other than Japan rapidly advanced their initiatives for the comprehensive management of the oceans, and as a result, Japan's lagging behind became conspicuous.

In response to these developments, the Nippon Foundation's 2002 policy recommendation “Oceans and Japan: Recommendations for Japan's Ocean Policy in the 21st Century” renewed the momentum to promote comprehensive ocean governance in Japan, and in 2005, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation's “Oceans and Japan: Recommendations for Japan's Ocean Policy in the 21st Century” was submitted to then Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe. In response to these recommendations, in 2006, a “Study Group on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy” was formed, consisting of cross-party lawmakers, and after discussions not only by the ruling and opposition parties' members but also by those experts involved in ocean-related fields, the “Ocean Policy Outline” and the “Outline of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy” were compiled. In 2007, the Basic Act on Ocean Policy was enacted as a Diet member's bill, and in 2008, the Cabinet approved the first Basic Plan on Ocean Policy based on the Basic Act on Ocean Policy.

3. Growing interest in Japan's ocean policy toward the Arctic

Following this process, Japan's ocean policy has taken various steps toward achieving “comprehensive ocean

governance,” and in 2013, the Cabinet approved the Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. This trend changed significantly in the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was approved by the Cabinet in 2018.

Although the first and second basic plans were updated based on the situation at the time of the Cabinet decision, they consisted of the following four parts: “General Remarks,” which introduced the background of the plan's formulation, “Chapter 1 Basic Policy of Measures with Regard to the Sea,” which defines the basic policy for each measure, “Chapter 2 Measures that the Government Should Take Comprehensively and Systematically with Regard to the Sea,” which stipulates the measures to be taken by the government, and “Chapter 3 Other Matters Necessary to Comprehensively and Systematically Promote Measures with Regard to the Sea,” which prescribes measures to support the aforementioned policies and others.

However, the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was revised in order to achieve the objective of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, “to realize a new oceanic State,” based on the recognition of the current situation in light of recent developments such as “The dwindling birthrate and aging population, globalization, and accelerating technical innovation in the IT field” and “Changes in Maritime Security, Circumstances Concerning Ocean Industries, Maintenance and Protection of the Marine Environment, and so on”. In order to position the “challenge of becoming a new maritime nation” as the policy direction of this plan, the plan takes a broad view of ocean policy from the perspective of maritime security, and in addition to measures related to maritime security, which is the core of the plan, it also includes measures with aspects that contribute to maritime security, and thus calls for “comprehensive maritime security” as a government policy.

For example, Chapter 2 (Ocean Measures for Comprehensive and Systematic Implementation by the Government) of the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy used to be structured in accordance with Chapter 3 (Articles 17-28) of the Basic Act on Ocean Policy, but in the Third Ocean Policy, beginning with “Maritime Security”, the list includes concrete measures such as, “Promote Industrial Use of the Ocean,” “Maintain and Conserve Marine Environment,” “Strengthening the Capacity for Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA),” “Promote Research and Development as to Maritime Research and Marine Science & Technology,” “Preserve Remote Islands and Develop EEZ,” “Promoting Arctic Policy,” “Secure International Coordination and Promote International Cooperation,” and “Develop Human Resources with Knowledge of the Ocean and to Advance Nationals' Understanding.” Thus, the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy has a very different structure from previous basic plans, and has attracted attention from all concerned.

Another feature of the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy is the inclusion of measures related to the Arctic. While initiatives related to the Arctic were addressed in the Second Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, they were comprehensively summarized in “Japan's Arctic Policy,” which was decided by the Headquarters for Ocean Policy in 2015. In the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which was subsequently approved by the Cabinet, “Research and Development,” “International Cooperation,” and “Sustainable Use,” which were specifically addressed in “Japan's Arctic Policy,” are defined as “Ocean Measures for Comprehensive and Systematic Implementation by the Government.” The Arctic Policy is positioned as a major component of Japan's ocean policy.

4. Future ocean policy in Japan

In the Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy approved by the Cabinet in 2023, Japan stated that “the situation surrounding the seas around Japan is becoming increasingly severe, and Japan's national interests in the ocean are exposed to ever more serious threats and risks” and that “there are changes that will have a major impact on the world's overall economic structure and competitive environment, such as the realization of carbon neutrality, the “securing of energy”, and the transformation of industrial structures triggered by Russia's aggression against Ukraine.” Viewing these as “responses to the changing circumstances surrounding ocean policy”, Japan considers this “a time to promote a major transformation of ocean policy, Ocean Transformation OX (Ocean Transformation) “ to “strengthen maritime security, foster new industries such as marine resource development and further develop existing industries, develop environment-related technologies, and promote the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Therefore, the Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy includes the following seven basic policies: “promotion of industrial use of the ocean,” “enhancement of scientific knowledge,” “promotion of DX in the ocean,” “promotion of Arctic policy,” “international partnership and cooperation,” “development and securing of human resources for the ocean and enhancement of public understanding,” and “countermeasures against infectious diseases. and “countermeasures against infectious diseases.

In addition, the “Priority Strategy for Ocean Policy” decided by the Headquarters for Ocean Policy in 2024 states that “Among the measures set forth in the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, the strategy is particularly important from the perspective of enhancing Japan's overall national strength and other national interests toward becoming a true maritime nation through harmonizing the development and utilization of frontier ocean areas with the conservation of the marine environment. The following initiatives are listed as “particularly important from the perspective of

enhancing Japan's comprehensive national strength and other national interests toward the realization of a becoming a true maritime nation through harmonizing the development and utilization of the oceans with the conservation of the marine environment, and to provide a more focused and specific strategy to realize important missions (priority measures for ocean development) that should be undertaken across ministries and agencies. “Promoting the development and use of autonomous unmanned vehicles (AUV),” “Promoting marine situational awareness (MDA) and information utilization,” “Promoting institutional arrangements for the deployment of offshore wind power generation in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ),” “Promoting the development of Minami-Torishima Island and its surrounding area,” “Assessing the status of border islands for the preservation of the area under the jurisdiction,” and “Promoting International Cooperation in Arctic Policy.”

These initiatives and changes suggest that Japan's ocean policy has shifted from a focus on Japan's surrounding areas to a specific orientation toward contributing to the establishment of global ocean governance.

5. Conclusion

This presentation has reviewed the efforts made to date in light of the two years that have passed since the current Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was approved by the Cabinet in April 2023, and has examined the initiatives required in the next Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which is expected to be approved in 2028. Through the discussions in this presentation, it has become clear that Japan's ocean policy has changed significantly since the 1990s, and that measures have taken shape since around the 2020s. Based on these results, I would like to point out some issues to be addressed in the future.

Although Japan's ocean policy has become more concrete with the decision on the Priority Strategy for Ocean Policy, one issue that needs to be addressed is that the relationship with the Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy is not always clear. Therefore, the Fifth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy should be approved in a manner that incorporates the Priority Strategy for Ocean Policy. In addition, since the Basic Plan on Ocean Policy is Japan's national strategy for ocean policy, it is also important to clarify its relationship with other national strategies, including the National Security Strategy.

Overcoming these challenges is unavoidable in order to present an effective ocean policy. Therefore, I would like to continue the study based on the discussions at this symposium with the aim of contributing to the Fifth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy.

【Table 1】Japan (red) and World Trends on Ocean Policy

| | |
|---------|--|
| 1958-72 | UNCLOS I (1958年) (ジュネーヴ海洋法四条約採択)、UNCLOS II (1960年) および UNCLOS III (1973年12月3日~1982年12月10日) 開催 UNCLOS I (1958) (adoption of the Four Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea), UNCLOS II (1960) and UNCLOS III (December 3, 1973 – December 10, 1982) |
| 1977 | 領海法制定 enactment of the Territorial Waters Act (1867) |
| 1982 | UNCLOS採択 Adaptation of the UNCLOS |
| 1992 | 地球サミット開催 (リオ宣言およびアジェンダ21採択) Earth Summit (Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 adopted) |
| 1994 | UNCLOS発効 UNCLOS enters into force |
| 1996 | UNCLOS批准、排他的経済水域法制定、領海法改正 Ratification of UNCLOS, enactment of Exclusive Economic Zone Law, revision of Territorial Waters Law |
| 1997 | UNFCCC-COP3開催 (京都議定書採択) UNFCCC-COP3 (Kyoto Protocol adopted) |
| 2000 | 国連ミレニアム・サミット開催 (MDGs採択) UN Millennium Summit (MDGs adopted) |
| 2007 | 海洋基本法制定 Basic Act on Ocean Policy enacted |
| 2008 | (第1期) 海洋基本計画閣議決定 Basic Plan on Ocean Policy approved by the Cabinet |
| 2009 | 海岸漂着物処理推進法制定 Law concerning the Treatment of Wastes Drifting Ashore enacted |
| 2010 | 沖ノ島島保全法制定 Enactment of the Okinotori-shima Preservation Act |
| 2013 | (第2期) 海洋基本計画閣議決定、国家安全保障戦略 (従来の「国防の基本方針」に代わるもの) 閣議決定 (2nd) Basic Plan on Ocean Policy and the National Security Strategy of Japan (replacing the "Basic Policy on National Defense") approved by the Cabinet |
| 2015 | 第70回国連総会開催 (SDGs採択)、我が国の北極政策閣議決定、UNFCCC-COP21開催 (パリ協定採択) The 70th UN General Assembly (SDGs adopted), Japan's Arctic policy approved by the Cabinet, UNFCCC-COP21 (Paris Agreement adopted) |
| 2018 | (第3期) 海洋基本計画閣議決定、海岸漂着物処理推進法改正 (3rd) Basic Plan on Ocean Policy approved by the Cabinet, revision of the Law concerning the Treatment of Wastes Drifting Ashore |
| 2022 | 防衛三文書 (国家安全保障戦略、国家防衛戦略 (従来の「防衛大綱」) および防衛力整備計画) 閣議決定 Cabinet approval of the Three Defense Documents (National Security Strategy of Japan, National Defense Strategy (previously known as the National Defense Program Guidelines), and Defense Buildup Program) |
| 2023 | 国連公海条約 (BBNJ協定) 採択、(第4期) 海洋基本計画閣議決定 UN Convention on the High Seas (BBNJ Agreement) adopted, Cabinet approves (4th) Basic Plan for Ocean Policy |
| 2024 | 海洋開発等重点戦略決定 Determination of Priority Strategy for Ocean Development |

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Summary in Japanese

我が国の海洋政策を振り返る
—第5期海洋基本計画を見据えて—小森 雄太¹²¹ 笹川平和財団, ² 明治大学

本報告は現行の海洋基本計画が2023年4月の閣議決定から2年を経たことを踏まえ、これまでの取り組みを振り返るとともに、2028年の策定が見込まれる次期海洋基本計画において求められる取り組みを考察する。

併せて、2024年4月に総合海洋政策本部が決定した「海洋開発等重点戦略」にも注目し、今後の我が国における海洋政策が実効性を担保した形で推進されるために求められる取り組みを提示することを目指す。

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Japan's Arctic Policy: Current Status and Challenges

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Abstract

Japan, while not an Arctic state, is significantly impacted by Arctic climate change and sees strategic opportunities in the region. Over the decades, it has advanced its Arctic engagement through research, international cooperation, and policy development, notably formalizing its Arctic Policy in 2015. The 2023 Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy reaffirms the Arctic as a key focus, despite disruptions caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which have hindered Arctic Council activities. Japan remains committed to promoting research, cooperation, and sustainable use while enhancing its global presence through bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

1. Overview

The Arctic is warming at an alarming rate, approximately three times faster than the global average. This rapid warming has led to significant environmental changes, including retreating sea ice, thawing permafrost, and increased coastal erosion. These changes have far-reaching implications not only for the Arctic region but for the entire planet. Understanding and addressing these impacts are crucial for achieving global climate stability. Japan is not an Arctic state but is readily affected by climate change in the Arctic region through oceanic and atmospheric circulation. Among Asian countries Japan is geographically located closest to the Arctic Ocean and enjoys many opportunities in economic and commercial sectors, such as utilization of the Arctic Sea Route.

In a nutshell, the following were turning points for Japan in its engagement in Arctic affairs. First, the research expedition of Professor Nakaya of Hokkaido University to Greenland in 1957. Throughout the 1990s, Japan also furthered its Arctic research capacity following the creation of the Arctic Environment Research Center at the National Institute of Polar Research. In 1991, Japan became the first non-Arctic state to establish an observation station in Ny-Ålesund. Japan was present at the signing ceremony of the Arctic Council's Ottawa Declaration in 1996. Between 1993 and 1999, the Ship and Ocean Foundation, forerunner of the SPF Ocean Policy Research Institute, partnered with Norway and Russia to establish the International Northern Sea Route Programme to help in mapping out Japan's potential shipping opportunities through Russia's Northern Sea Route. In 2010, the Ocean Policy Research Foundation (OPRF), direct predecessor of OPRI, initiated the Arctic Conference Japan, which engages experts in fields such as international law, security, scientific research, shipbuilding.

Having submitted its application to become an Arctic Council Observer in 2009, Japan's engagement in Arctic affairs increased in 2013 when it was granted observer


status at the Kiruna Ministerial Meeting, along with China, India, Italy, Singapore, and South Korea. This status enabled Japan to participate more actively in Arctic discussions and collaborations, laying the groundwork for a more structured Arctic policy. In 2015, "Japan's Arctic Policy" was formally adopted as a decision of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy and became the cornerstone of Japan's Arctic involvement. This Policy is a comprehensive statement of Japan's fundamental policy outlook towards the Arctic, with a strong emphasis on international cooperation. In particular, it outlines three key interests in the Arctic: (1) Research and Development, (2) International Cooperation, and (3) Sustainable Use. Japan's policy promotes the rule of law and international cooperation in a peaceful and orderly manner.

On May 15, 2018, the Third Basic Plan on Ocean Policy was approved by the Meeting of the Headquarters for Ocean Policy, followed by a cabinet decision. This was a significant milestone as it was the first time the plan explicitly included the Arctic Policy as one of its main measures, thus making it legally binding. This highlights the increasing importance of the Arctic in Japan's ocean policy. In the Plan, the "Promotion of Arctic policy" was positioned as one of seven key measures to be steadily promoted. This strategic focus was reinforced in subsequent plans, including the Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy. These plans emphasize the continued advancement of three core pillars: research and development, international cooperation, and sustainable use of Arctic resources.

Japan's basic position on Arctic issues is grounded in the principles of international law, emphasizing "Ensuring the Rule of Law and Promoting International Cooperation" in its policy. The Arctic Ocean is governed by international law, including the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It is imperative to respect the freedom of navigation and other principles enshrined in international law, which Japan

will do in its activities in the Arctic.

Science and science diplomacy have always been key priorities for Japan. During the negotiations of the 2017 Agreement on Scientific Cooperation under the auspices of the Arctic Council, Japan was one of the few key observer states that positively contributed to the negotiations.



2. The Impact of Russia's Invasion of Ukraine on Japan's Arctic Policy

Russia's Invasion of Ukraine had significant repercussions for Arctic cooperation. In response, the Arctic States, excluding Russia, issued a joint statement condemning the invasion and suspended their participation in all Arctic Council meetings. This suspension halted cooperation and dialogue in all Arctic areas, including scientific research. Since 2024, the Arctic Council's Working Groups and Expert Groups have resumed their activities; however, they have not resumed all their activities, and prospects remain uncertain.

In April 2023, the Cabinet approved the Fourth Basic Plan on Ocean Policy, which continues to position Arctic policy as a "key measure to be steadily promoted" in the Plan. The Plan also addresses the impact of the invasion of Ukraine, as in the following statement:

"Currently, due to the impact of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, some Arctic-related activities, including the Arctic Council, have been suspended, creating uncertainty about the future of the Arctic situation. However, our country remains committed to advancing the three pillars of its Arctic policy—research and development, international cooperation, and sustainable use. We will continue to exchange information with relevant countries and ensure thorough preparation for all possible scenarios."¹

Japan has dispatched experts and government officials to the working groups and task forces of the Arctic Council, thereby enhancing its contributions to Arctic science. However, despite the resumption of working groups in 2024, contributions through a Council with limited functionality remain constrained, and the outlook is

uncertain. On the other hand, as stated in the Fourth Basic Plan, it is increasingly important for Japan to "always consider the optimal combination of bilateral and multilateral approaches, further promote exchanges of views with Arctic and other relevant countries, maximize the use of international frameworks related to the Arctic, strengthen the dissemination of our country's perspectives and achievements in observation and research, and enhance our presence."²

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J-3

From the JCAR long-term plan to ICARP IV and IPY5, Japan's potential for future polar research

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ABSTRACT

The future vision for polar research is being discussed. There are discussions on IPY5 from 2032–33, a long-term plan for Arctic research for the 10 years from 2025 (ICARP IV), and a long-term vision compiled by JCAR in Japan. A new Arctic research project will be launched in 2025, and an icebreaking research vessel will be in operation in 2027. In addition to the UN's ocean-related UNDOS, a plan targeting the cryosphere will also begin in 2025. This article provides an overview of the IPY's objectives and challenges, as well as Japan's potential for contribution to the international movements.

IPY5

The future vision of polar research is being discussed in various situations. The fifth International Polar Year (IPY5) is planned for 2032–33, and a concept note was released in 2023, and an updated version of that was released in 2024 (Fig.1). The discussion is focused how to prepare the system in the period before IPY. IPY is expected not only to carry out a concentrated campaign observation in that year, but also to create an international cooperation system for polar science by 2032.

The IPY5 will be guided by a broad set of principles, including the following:

- Fostering international collaboration; Encouraging open data and open science; Striving for holistic, systemic, transdisciplinary research approaches; Producing knowledge for action with direct societal relevance;
- Co-producing policy-relevant knowledge and research and engaging with decision makers; Including rights holders, stakeholders, and civil society in research processes;
- Committing to inclusive, diverse, and equitable research practices; Encouraging effective science communication, polar education, and public engagement. Ensuring balanced involvement and information flow, areas of common interest, and knowledge exchange across Arctic and Antarctic polar science communities and networks.
- Co-designing research programs and co-producing knowledge across knowledge systems, with a particular focus on meaningful partnership between academic

research and Indigenous knowledge holders, while making sure that the programs are building Arctic Indigenous Peoples' capacity to contribute and participate in a constructive way; and Engaging in capacity building for early career and as for previously unrelated disciplinary researchers and knowledge holders.




Fig. 1 IPY Concept note with roadmap (IPY secretariat, 2024)

ICARP IV

The International Arctic Science Committee (IASC) is proceeding with the Fourth International Conference on Arctic Research Planning (ICARP IV) as a process for discussing Arctic science for the next 10 years from 2025. Priority issues will be compiled by March 2025. ICARP-IV has set seven priority areas (Fig. 2) and is currently under discussion, aiming to compile them in 2025.




Fig. 2 Priority areas of ICARP IV (IASC)

ICARP IV is promoted as an Arctic activity linked to the fifth IPY. ICARP IV considers plans for the next ten years, starting from 2025. This period also included the years of IPY preparation and implementation. ICARP

IV will compile proposals in March 2025 and consider their implementation in 2026. The ICARP was conducted three times every ten years. ICARP IV is different from previous conferences. It will focus on the process of creation rather than the convergence point of deliberating and publishing the finished product. We hope that more people will participate in this process. The ICARP aims to realize the joint consideration of these issues and develop an essential plan.

Japanese approaches:

From individual to community

Japan Consortium for Arctic Research (JCAR) was established in 2011, prior to the start of scientific activities at GRENE Arctic Project in 2011. JCAR set up a mission to compile a long-term vision for Arctic research with a 10-20 year perspective (Fig.3).

This report aims to share the current understanding and future visions, not only for the corresponding scientist of that research area, but for the scientists in the different research area.

From Domestic to the International

The first version was published in 2014, and after minor revisions in 2018, published a fully updated long-term vision in 2024, consisting of about 180 authors. From the compiled JCAR long-term plans, we wish to share useful ideas to ICARP-IV.




Fig. 3 Long-term planning of Arctic Research (JCAR)

From current to next generations

Fourteen members from Japan are participating in the ICARP-IV priority issue review team. From JCAR's long-term vision, IASC's ICARP IV, and IPY5, we are expanding the field's perspective and are involved while also including a wide range of generations, including young people.

Will we have progress from IPY4?

Various large-scale observational campaigns were conducted during IPY 2007/08. However, improvements in coordination are required to optimally combine multiple resources. IPY led to the formation of the Sustaining Arctic Observing Networks (SAON), which includes observation recommendations and plan coordination; the Arctic Observing Summit (AOS), which serves as a place to consider such matters.

APECS, which serves as an international network for young people, was also established by IPY2007/08. At that time, it contained approximately 1,400 members worldwide, but by 2024, it contains 5,000 members in 29 countries in 2024. APEC was born by IPY, and now APECS is working to drive IPY.

Polar Educators International (PEI) was also an initiative started after the IPY2007/08. PEI promotes an understanding of the polar regions in the educational field. The momentum generated by the IPY will support the next IPY. Therefore, more attention should be paid to the emergence of novel mechanisms. Reinforcement and contribution are required prior to the next IPY.

Preparing for next stages

Preparations are underway to start a new Arctic research project following the Arctic Research Acceleration Project (ArCS II) from 2025. In addition, various developments are underway toward IPY5, such as the launch of an icebreaking research vessel capable of operating in the icy waters of the Arctic from 2027.

United Nations Decade of Action for Cryospheric Science (UNDACS) is scheduled to start in 2025 as well as UNDOS.

We look forward to introducing the latest technology and international collaborative operations emphasized by the IPY in the past. The IPY concept note enhances the science to be led to collaboration with society and indigenous people. In addition to cutting-edge research technology, the spread of society will also be considered. We hope that the issues raised in the 5th IPY will provide an opportunity to create a new research system.

From the IPY4, Japan had significant change in Arctic policy and governmental intent, and new system of discussing and implementing Arctic science. Those scientific projects have achieved results in research activities. Japan's contributions will be expected to face to the international activities in new era.

Summary in Japanese

JCAR 長期計画から ICARP IV そして IPY5 へ、極地研究に向けた日本の可能性

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極地研究の将来構想が議論されている。2032-33 年の IPY-5 への議論、2025 年からの 10 年間を対象にした北極研究の長期計画 (ICARP-IV)、また国内では JCAR がまとめた長期構想がある。新たな北極研究プロジェクトの開始や、砕氷可能な研究船が就航する。国連の海洋に関する UNDOS に加え、2025 年からは雪氷圏を対象とする計画が始まる。IPY の目的と課題、日本の涵養の可能性について概観する。

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J-4

Review of Russia's Northern Sea Route Regulation

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Navigation along the Northern Sea Route has been ruled by Russia's law on the Northern Sea Route. Since the first implementation of the law in 1999, this regulation has been amended several times. This paper reviews the change of NSR regulation.

Key words: Northern Sea Route, navigation rule,

1. Overview

Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) article 234, which allows a coastal state to prescribe and enforce laws and regulations to prevent, reduce, and control vessel-source pollution in ice-covered areas within their exclusive economic zone, Russia has been implemented the law on the Northern Sea Route. In Russia, the Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transport within the Russian Ministry of Transport has been in charge of maritime logistics, ports, shipping, and maritime affairs. And the Northern Sea Route (herein after NSR) has been under the jurisdiction of the Northern Sea Route Administration (herein after NSRA) within the Federal Agency of Maritime and River Transport. The NSRA was responsible for all aspects of navigation, including the review of applications for navigation approval, the provision of navigation routes and navigation-related information, the management of compliance with navigation regulations and penalties for violations, and the development and maintenance of navigation infrastructure. During this period, the Russian Federation took the opportunity of the successful pilot trans-NSR voyage by SOVCOMFLOT in 2010 to establish a federal plan for the development of the NSR and to promote its use as an international shipping route through various improvements for the transport of oil and natural gas from the Kara Sea coast, as well as international trans-NSR shipping.

In the course of these efforts, the rules and regulations related to navigation of the NSR were frequently updated, and the navigation management system was also drastically reorganized (in 2020). In some sense, this series of changes has been driven by fluctuating international maritime market and natural resource market, Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and invasion to Ukraine, the economic sanctions imposed by Western nations in response, and the development of oil and natural gas exploitation along the Arctic coast of Russia. And in 2020, much of the

authority over the operation, management, maintenance, and development of the NSR was transferred to ROSATOM, a state-owned company that operates nuclear icebreakers in the NSR. This reform represents a major change in the development of the NSR, and it has made the goals of the NSR in Russia much clearer.

Through these years, this Russian regulation and management system for navigation of the NSR has been becoming a major barrier to foreign shipping companies with its uncertainty, unpredictable and unilateral change, and opaque enforcement.

2. Review of the Russian regulation for the NSR navigation

In this study, Russian regulation for navigation of the NSR is examined from the declaration of the opening of the NSR in 1987 to date. Here, application for the permission of navigation, definition of water area, criteria of the requirement for icebreaker assistance according to ice condition and ice class, ice pilot requirement, and management body are examined. Table-1 shows quick view of the change

Table-1 Brief history of the NSR regulations

| year | Rules |
|------|---|
| 1999 | Implementation of the law on the Northern Sea Route based on the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation No. 81-FZ of April 30, 1999 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Application and organizational procedures of the NSR navigation permission ● Rules of icebreaker assistance ● Rules of ice pilotage channeling support for vessels ● Rules of pilotage on the water channels ● Regulations of navigation, hydrographic, and hydro-meteorological support for navigation ● Rules of radio communication in the water area of the NSR ● And other regulations related to safe navigation, preventing pollution, and other related matters |
| 2013 | "Rules of navigation in the Northern Sea Route water area" approved by order N 7, January 2013 |

| | |
|------|--|
| | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ●NSR water area was re-defined as; confined in the East with the Line of Maritime Demarcation with the U.S.A. and Cape Dezhnev parallel in Bering Strait, with the meridian of Cape Mys Zhelania to the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago in the West, with the eastern coastline of the Novaya Zemlya Archipelago and the western borders of Matochkin Strait, Kara Strait and Yugorski Shar. ●Application procedure was digitalized and result is issued within 14days after submission of application document attached to the e-mail. ●Icebreaker assistance fee and pilotage fee was determined by tariff chart according to vessel's tonnage, ice class, distance of support, and navigation period, with consideration of icebreaker operating state-owned company. <p>Source : CHNL (2013)</p> |
| 2017 | <p>Polar Code Certificate documents was added to the application if the Polar Code rules are applied to the vessel.</p> <p>Icebreaker shall have Russian flag and ice pilot shall have Russian nationality.</p> <p>Cargo ship that transports crude oil, natural gas(LNG), condensate, coal, which is exploited in Russia and loaded in Russian Arctic port, shall has Russian flag.(amendment to N460-FZ, 2017)</p> |
| 2019 | <p>Seven water area along the NSR, of which icebreaker assistance and issuing approval/disapproval to entering water area, are renewed into 28 water areas. And icebreaker tariff table is updated according to the 28 water areas -> entered into force in 2020 amendment No.1487.(Fig.1)</p> |
| 2020 | <p>RULES OF NAVIGATION IN THE WATER AREA OF THE NORTHERN SEA ROUTE, The Government Decree of the Russian Federation, Sep.18 2020 No.1487</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Marine Operation Center is established in the ROSATOM and governs icebreaker operation and pilotage according to the hydrographic and hydro-meteorological condition, development of the water channel, and gives a consent of permission to the agency which issues the permission. |
| 2022 | <p>Federal State Budgetary Institution (FSBI) The Northern Sea Route General Administration established on the basis of the Federal Law of June 28, 2022 No.184-FL «On Amendments to Article 51 of the Merchant Shipping Code of the Russian Federation» and the Federal Law “On the State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom”.</p> |
| 2024 | <p>For those double acting ice class vessel of Arc 7 and Arc 8 are permitted to navigate in any ice conditions from January 1 -31 and from June 1 to December 31. And some other amendments are approved.(Resolution Jan.31, 2024, N0.97)</p> |




Fig.1 Description of the border of the NSR

By the amendment in 2013, criteria of permission according to the ice condition, water area, ice class, season and icebreaker assistance requirement were more detailed. And icebreaker assistance fee became more detailed as well. As a result, following the new regulation, non-ice class vessel is permitted to sail the NSR if water is open without ice. And independent navigation is also allowed if ice class and ice condition is suitable in the criteria table. However, criteria of ice condition was not defined specifically and was still uncertain. And icebreaker fee was decided finally by negotiation of icebreaker operating company(Rosatomflot) and still uncertain. Thus, there still exists a serious barrier for foreign ships to navigate the NSR.

Then, in 2020, Russian governing structure of NSR drastically changed. By this, The Marine Operation Center of State Energy Corporation ROSATOM becomes a responsible body for all the management of the NSR instead of the NSRA and icebreaker operations as well.(Belkin, 2020) In 2022, the FSBI NSR General Administration was established under the ROSATOM body(ROSATOM, 2022) to govern the NSR operation and development more strongly.

Due to Russia's invasion to Ukraine, NSR is only used for Russian domestic transport and, crude oil and LNG transport from the Kara Sea area today. And China is the only user of trans-NSR cargo transport, and dominant destination of crude oil and LNG transport to Asia(Kjell, 2024). Thus, it is quite uncertain of future international use of the NSR. And how does the Russia's NSR regulation effects to the international maritime sector.

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Summary in Japanese

和文要約

ロシア北方航路の航行規則の変遷と課題

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ロシア北方航路の航行は、国連海洋法条約 234 条を根拠に、ロシアが定める航行規則 (the law on the Northern Sea Route) のもとで行われている。ロシアによる航行規則は、ロシア北方航路の国際開放に対応し、1999 年に策定されて以来、複数回の改定が行われて来た。本論は、この改定の変遷について、航行許可条件や砕氷船支援料金などについて注目して整理を行ったものである。

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J-5

The Role of Epistemic Community on Arctic Governance

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ABSTRACT

Epistemic communities are expert networks that influence policymaking by reducing uncertainty. Platforms like the North Pacific Arctic Conference (NPAC) and North Pacific Arctic Research Community (NPARC) enable East Asian countries (Japan, China, South Korea) to collaborate on Arctic governance. These platforms, involving experts and policymakers, have the potential to evolve into influential epistemic communities, strengthening non-Arctic states' roles in Arctic affairs.

Introduction

This research focuses on exploring the possibility of an epistemic community promoting Arctic governance. An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. The community includes natural scientists, social scientists and various stakeholders. All the members share a set of normative and principled beliefs. By influencing the preferences of policy makers, the role mechanisms of the epistemic community can facilitate international cooperation. With the Russia - Ukraine war, it has been difficult to develop cooperation on Arctic governance. In this difficult situation, what we can do as researchers or as academic organizations is to be a network of specialist groups focusing on Arctic governance to work together to find solutions to problems.

Why an Epistemic Community?

An epistemic community is defined as a transnational network of experts who hold authority over specific areas of knowledge. Its members share normative and principled beliefs, causal beliefs, and standards of validity, and they engage in common policy-oriented enterprises. According to Peter M. Haas, a proponent of epistemic community theory, states are assumed to be not only pursuers of power and wealth but also reducers of uncertainty. Therefore, when faced with issues of uncertainty, policymakers seek advice from experts. This creates a significant opportunity for epistemic communities to influence policymakers' perceptions of their interests.

Haas argues that the extent of influence wielded by epistemic communities can be explained by the "consistency of knowledge" and the "degree of

embedding in bureaucratic organizations." In other words, as long as the knowledge of the epistemic community remains consistent, its advice can maintain a strong impact. Moreover, the more deeply an epistemic community is embedded within domestic bureaucratic organizations, the greater its influence on policymaking becomes. This degree of embedding is highly emphasized in epistemic community theory and is often used to explain differences in responses among states.

Furthermore, Haas asserts that the influence of an epistemic community persists as long as its members retain decision-making authority within the domestic policy process. When members of like-minded epistemic communities are embedded across multiple countries' bureaucratic organizations, similar policies tend to be adopted in those countries, promoting international policy coordination.

In epistemic community theory, which assumes that policymakers are reducers of uncertainty, it is posited that the scientific knowledge provided by epistemic communities strongly influences policymakers' perceptions of their interests.

After the outbreak of the Russian – Ukraine war, it has been difficult to develop cooperation on Arctic governance under the Arctic Council. There are differing opinions regarding the direction of future reforms for the Arctic Council. Some scholars in the United States advocate for amending the Ottawa Declaration to modify the principle of unanimity and include security and military issues on the Arctic Council's agenda. Others propose relying on the Nordic Council of Ministers to host informal discussions, inviting the United States, Canada, and Indigenous groups to participate. This would not replace the work of the Arctic Council but rather serve as a political safe haven for Arctic negotiations. Furthermore, some scholars advocate for weakening the role of the Arctic Council and suggest establishing a "Nordic+" platform. This platform would be led primarily by the five Nordic countries, with the United States and Canada invited to participate.

This kind of situation is disadvantageous for the realization of Arctic interests by East Asia Countries (Japan, China and South Korea) which are observer members of the Arctic Council. A network for joint deliberation composed of experts from observer

countries or “observer countries+” is necessary.

North Pacific Arctic Conference (NPAC)

Since 2011, the East-West Center in Honolulu has brought together a diverse group of Arctic stakeholders - including experts, policymakers, researchers, private-sector leaders, Indigenous representatives, and community advocates from around the world. These annual discussions have focused particularly on the North Pacific region, emphasizing the shared goal of preserving the Arctic as a peaceful and prosperous area in an increasingly volatile and rapidly evolving global context.

The North Pacific Arctic Conference, jointly organized by the East-West Center and the Korea Maritime Institute, fosters open, off-the-record conversations. Participants work collaboratively to identify emerging Arctic challenges, explore strategies for addressing them through policy, and assess the merits and drawbacks of critical issues shaping the Arctic agenda. The conference prioritizes interactive dialogue and idea-sharing over formal presentations, encouraging meaningful engagement and diverse perspectives.

From the start, it was evident that cultivating the next generation of Arctic leaders was a vital aspect of the conference. Since 2017, NPAC has actively encouraged the involvement of early and mid-career NPAC Fellows, chosen for their ability to offer innovative perspectives and insights. This initiative not only enhances their Arctic networks but also facilitates meaningful engagement with experienced Arctic experts and their peers, fostering the development of emerging leaders in Arctic affairs.

North Pacific Arctic Research Community (NPARC) Meeting

The North Pacific Arctic Research Community (NPARC) was established in 2014 in response to the growing interest in Arctic affairs among non-Arctic nations, particularly China, Japan, and South Korea. This initiative emerged as a platform to promote interdisciplinary research and collaboration among these countries, addressing emerging challenges and opportunities in the Arctic.

The idea for NPARC was inspired by significant global developments in Arctic governance. In 2013, the Arctic Council granted observer status to six non-Arctic nations, including five from Asia—most notably, China, Japan, and South Korea. Recognizing the rising global interest in Arctic issues, the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI) proposed the creation of a dedicated platform for dialogue and knowledge exchange. This platform aims to foster regional

interdisciplinary research on Arctic challenges and opportunities, share research outcomes to enhance capacity building among member nations, and facilitate cooperation through forums, seminars, and joint research initiatives.

Since its inception, NPARC has hosted annual meetings, rotating among the three member countries—China, Japan, and Korea. Over the past decade, the organization has demonstrated its adaptability to global changes, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and shifting geopolitical dynamics.

Currently, NPARC's organizing committee consists of three prominent research institutions: the Shanghai Institutes for International Studies (SIIS) in China, the Arctic Research Center at Hokkaido University in Japan, and the Korea Maritime Institute (KMI) in Korea.

At the 2023 NPARC meeting, the three Arctic Ambassadors from China (Mr. Gao Feng, Special Representative for Arctic Affairs, People's Republic of China), South Korea (Mr. Park Chong-suk, South Korean Arctic Ambassador) and Japan (Mr. Takewaka Keizo, Japanese Ambassador for International Economic Affairs and Arctic Affairs) were invited to attend the meeting and delivered keynote speeches respectively. This was the first time that the Arctic Ambassador attended the NPARC meeting. The three ambassadors explored the progress and contributions of observer states to the Arctic Council over the past decade and emphasized that dialogue and cooperation on the Arctic challenges by China, Korea and Japan is important. Also, they mentioned that there are opportunities for the three countries to enhance their engagement through platforms like the Trilateral High-Level Dialogue and international Arctic related events.

Results

This research examined the effectiveness of epistemic communities in addressing the Arctic interests of non-Arctic states and fostering dialogue between non-Arctic states and Arctic nations.

Researchers and academic organizations that form epistemic communities are crucial for identifying the challenges associated with Arctic activities and offering a holistic perspective through transdisciplinary approaches. In essence, robust epistemic communities contribute in two significant ways: first, by fostering collaboration in a domain often reliant on unilateral actions; and second, by delivering science-based insights to policymakers, enabling them to align their political and economic goals more effectively.

NPAC and NPARC have the potential to

become epistemic communities. The discussions at NPAC and NPARC have not yet been fully examined in terms of how they specifically influence the Arctic policies of each country. However, at this stage, it can be said that both NPAC and NPARC have the potential to become epistemic communities. In particular, NPARC has invited Arctic ambassadors from Japan, China, and South Korea to its meetings, which means that, though originally a Track 2 level meeting, NPARC has also provided opportunities for Track 1.5 level interactions. Therefore, these two gatherings have the potential to develop into epistemic communities, serving as platforms for non-Arctic states to engage in Arctic governance.

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Summary in Japanese

北極ガバナンスにおける知識共同体の役割

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本研究は、北極ガバナンスの促進における知識共同体の役割を探ることに焦点を当てている。知識共同体とは、特定の分野において認められた専門知識と能力を持ち、その分野や課題領域に関連する政策知識に対して権威ある主張を行う専門家のネットワークである。知識共同体の構成員には、自然科学者、社会科学者、さまざまな利害関係者が含まれる。すべてのメンバーは、規範的かつ原則的な信念を共有している。知識共同体の役割メカニズムは、政策決定者の選好に影響を与えることにより、国際協力の促進が図られると考える。

ロシア・ウクライナ戦争以降、北極ガバナンスにおける協力関係の構築が困難になっている。本研究の目的は、この困難な状況下で、研究者やシンクタンクとしての私たちができることについて、北極ガバナンスに焦点を当てた専門家グループのネットワークとなり、知識共同体理論の下で、問題解決に向けて協力し合う可能性を探ることである。

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